....INDEX
Copenhaguizar, copenhaguiser, copenhagenize
Política de Inglaterra de destruir por todos los medios, incluido el ataque sin previa declaración de guerra, es decir a traición, el poder naval de cualquier país, aunque no fuese enemigo, que comenzase a aumentarlo, sin esperar a que ese país se aproximase ni de lejos al poderío británco en el mar, que consideraba Inglaterra como su dominio exclusivo
Cabo Passaro
El 11 de agosto de 1718 la flota española que intentaba recuperar Sicilia, perdida en la Guerra de Sucesión, fue atacada y destruida por la escuadra británica en la mal llamada batalla del Cabo Passaro sin mediar la preceptiva declaración de guerra entre ambas naciones.
Pearl Harbor
La acción alevosa de Pearl Harbor la aprendieron y copiaron los japoneses de lo que venía haciendo Inglaterra con el nombre de copenhaguenize, copenhaguizar: destruir o capturar una flota sin previa declaración de guerra mediante una, más que sorpresa, traición.
Copenhaguizar, copenhagenize
El nombre viene de la Primera Batalla de Copenhague (1801) en la que Nelson, sin previa declaración de guerra, es decir a traición, atacó y bombardeó Copenhague hasta que el rey de Dinamarca, que era neutral, se rindió y entregó a los ingleses la flota danesa. Nelson lo hizo para eliminar la posibilidad de que Dinamarca saliese de su neutralidad y colaborase con su gran flota con el Bloqueo Continental impuesto por Napoleón, que excluía la admisión del comercio inglés y de toda nave británica de todo puerto del contiente europeo. Cuando Inglaterra, junto con su aliada Suecia, con la que mantenía su comercio, reanudó la guerra con la Francia napoleónica para romper el Bloqueo Continental, Dinamarca se alió con Francia contra Inglaterra y Suecia, pero eso no le importaba nada a Inglaterra, porque ya había privado a Dinamarca de su poder naval.
Y en 1940 Mers-el-Kébir
El 3 de julio de 1940, durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, fue un ataque naval británico contra los barcos de guerra de la Armada francesa en la base naval de Mers. El Kébir, cerca de Orán, en la costa de la Argelia francesa. Francia era ya neutral, ya no estaba en la guerra, porque había firmado un armisticio con Alemania y con Italia, sin estar en guerra con Inglaterra tampoco, ni mucho menos; aunque había dejado ya de ser su aliada contra Alemania y contra Italia. El ataque fue la parte principal de la Operación Catapulta, un plan británico para neutralizar o destruir barcos franceses neutrales para evitar que cayeran en manos alemanas tras la derrota aliada en la Batalla de Francia. El bombardeo británico de la base mató a 1.297 militares franceses, hundió un acorazado y dañó otros cinco barcos. Las pérdidas británicas fueron cinco aviones derribados y la muerte de dos tripulantes. El ataque por aire y por mar fue llevado a cabo por la Royal Navy, después de que Francia hubiera firmado armisticios con Alemania e Italia, que entraron en vigor el 25 de junio (Wikipedia).
Copenhaguenizar la flota alemana en la Primera Guerra Mundial
En 1908, Lord Fisher [Almirante Jefe o Primer Lord del Mar] dijo al rey Eduardo VII: "Hay que copenhaguenizar la flota alemana". El hecho de esta conversación y de estas palabras lo refiere el almirante Bacon en su biografía de Fisher. Y lo comenta diciendo: "Fisher, siempre previsor, calculaba que, cuando el programa naval alemán... acabase, Alemania nos declararía la guerra, septiembre u octubre de 1914 era la fecha prevista por él: se basaba en la finalización de las obras de modificación del canal de Kiel... Para él la única forma de anular la amenaza de Alemania era capturar su flota, repetir lo que ocurrió en 1801 en Copenhague"... ¿Por qué esperar y dar a Alemania la ventaja de escoger el momento del ataque?" Y asegura Bacon que el rey le dijo a Fisher que "era una idea loca, completamente contraria a nuestra manera de obrar" (Bacon, Lord Fisher. Londres, 1929). Claro, claro. Sólo que hay hechos que corroboran esa conversación que señala la política británica como causa principal de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Por una parte hasta la Wikipedia trae actualmente en su versión en inglés la confirmación de esa propuesta de Fisher a Eduardo VII, hecha además con reiteración: "Dentro de sus atribuciones como Almirante Jefe o Primer Lord del Mar, Fisher propuso en múltiples ocasiones al rey Eduardo VII que Gran Bretaña aprovechase su superioridad naval para copenhaguenizar a la flota en Kiel -esto es, para destruirla con un ataque preventivo por sorpresa sin declaración de guerra, como la Royal Navy había hecho contra la flota danesa durante las guerras napoleónicas. En sus memorias, Fisher recuerda una conversacción en la que fue informado de que "él era el hombre más odiado en Alemania por todos del Emperador para abajo", porque había llegado a oídos del Emperador la idea de Fisher de copenhaguenizar la flota alemana". Fisher posteriormente añadía que él dudaba que la sugerencia se hubiese filtrado y creía que "el Emperador dijo aquello sólo porque sabía que era lo que Gran Bretaña debería haber hecho" (Fisher: Memorias y recuerdos, pg.49).
Pero ya en las pgs. 22 y 23 del primer volumen de estas Memorias de Fisher que está en Archive, y que es al que redirige el enlace de la referencia de la Wikipedia en inglés en su voz Lord Fisher dice:
In 1908, he predicted that war between Britain and Germany would occur in October 1914, which later proved accurate, basing his statement on the projected completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal, which would allow Germany to move its large warships safely from the Baltic to the North Sea.[113]
Y en las pgs. 34 y 35 de dichas Memories dice:
NELSON'S COPENHAGEN In May, 1907, England had seven "Dreadnoughts" ready for battle, and Germany had not one. And England had flotillas of submarines peculiarly adapted to the shallower German waters when Germany had none. Even in 1908 Germany only had four submarines. At that time, in the above letter I wrote to King Edward, I approached His Majesty, and quoted certain apposite sayings of Mr. Pitt about dealing with the probable enemy before he got too strong. It is admitted that it was not quite a gentlemanly sort of thing for Nelson to go and destroy the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen without notice, but "la raison du plus fort est tou jours la meilleure."
NELSON'S COPENHAGEN In May, 1907, England had seven "Dreadnoughts" ready for battle, and Germany had not one. And England had flotillas of submarines peculiarly adapted to the shallower German waters when Germany had none. Even in 1908 Germany only had four submarines. At that time, in the above letter I wrote to King Edward, I approached His Majesty, and quoted certain apposite sayings of Mr. Pitt about dealing with the probable enemy before he got too strong. It is admitted that it was not quite a gentlemanly sort of thing for Nelson to go and destroy the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen without notice, but "la raison du plus fort est tou jours la meilleure." Therefore, in view of the known steadfast German purpose, as always unmitigatedly set forth by the German High Authority that it was Germany's set intention to make even England's mighty Navy hesitate at sea, it seemed to me simply a sagacious act on England's part to seize the German Fleet when it was so very easy of accomplishment in the manner I sketched out to His Majesty, and probably without bloodshed. But, alas! even the very whisper of it excited exasperation against the supposed bellicose, but really peaceful, First Sea Lord, and the project was damned. At that time Germany was peculiarly open to this "peaceful penetration". A new Kiel Canal, at the cost of many, many millions? had been rendered necessary by the advent of the "Dread- nought"; but worse still for the Germans, it was necessary for them to spend further vast millions in deepening not only the approaches to the German Harbours, but the Harbours themselves, to allow the German "Dread- noughts," when built, to be able to float. In doing this,the Germans were thus forced to arrange that thirty-three British pre- "Dreadnoughts" should be capable of attacking their shores, which shallow water had previously de- nied them. Such, therefore, was the time of stress and unreadiness in Germany that made it peculiarly timely to repeat Nelson's Copenhagen. Alas! we had no Pitt, no Bismarck, no Gambetta! And consequently came those terrible years of War, with millions massacred and maimed and many millions more of their kith and kin with pierced hearts and bereft of all that was mortal for their joy.
Y por fin en es pg. 49 de dichas Memories de Fisher dice:
The German Emperor sent for Beit, for I gathered that Beit saw how peace was threatened. I don't know if this was the reason of the interview. In this Imperial conversation my name turned up, as Lord Esher had made a statement that by all from the German Emperor downwards I was the most hated man in Germany. The German Emperor did say to Beit that I was dangerous, and that he knew of my ideas as regards the Baltic being Germany's vulnerable spot, and he had heard of my idea for the "Copenhagening" of the German Fleet. But this last I much doubt. He only said it because he knew it was what we ought to have done.
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Y en la propia Wiki en inglés, en la voz Copenhagenization, a la que redirige Copenhagening, dice:
Copenhagenization is an expression which was coined in the early nineteenth century, and has seen occasional use since. The expression refers to a decisive blow delivered to a foreign navy while it is still anchored at port in its home nation. It originated from the Royal Navy's bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, during the Napoleonic Wars. The term is not recorded in either the Merriam-Webster or the Oxford English dictionaries.
Background
In 1807, the United Kingdom was at war with France, and Napoleon Bonaparte had created an embargo known as the Continental System to strike at Britain's overseas trade. Denmark–Norway was neutral in the war, but was believed to be leaning towards joining the embargo; also, her sizeable navy and geographic position at the entrance to the Baltic, which was located in the path of Britain's trade route with her ally, Sweden. In August 1807 Britain chose to attack Denmark, landing an army on Zealand which invaded Copenhagen and commenced bombarding the city after the Danish king refused to surrender his fleet. Denmark was forced to capitulate and surrender her fleet anyway: after the British withdrawal Denmark joined in an alliance with France against Britain and Sweden, but without a fleet she had little to offer. [1]
First use of the term
The term "Copenhagenization" first appeared in an article in the Philadelphia Aurora in February 1808, which suggested British spies had traduced Denmark and would do so in America also: 'Her spies and agents here are pursuing the same course and expect the same consequences. Our cities will be Copenhagenized—and our ships, timber, treasury, etc. will be amicably deposited in Great Britain'[2] In April William Cobbett made a robust response in his weekly Political Register: 'Oh, that example of Copenhagen has worked wonders in the world! It will save a deal of strife, war, and bloodshed. I (would) like to see the name of that city become a verb in the American dictionary. "Our cities will be copenhagenized" is an excellent phrase. It's very true, that Sir John Warren would copenhagenize New York with very little trouble...'[3]
Further uses
The term "Copenhagenization" appeared in several American sources during the 19th century. In 1830, the American author Richard Emmons published an Epic poem on the late war of 1812, The Fredoniad, or Independence preserved [4] in which he wrote of the merits and risks of independence:
Aw'd by the naval sceptre of the king—
Our fleet would Copenhagenize each town,
And with the torch burn every hamlet down.
The term was later used by Justin Winsor in his Narrative and critical history of America (1888) where he described the outfitting of independent vessels to warfare being done somewhat covertly, in order to avoid said vessels being "Copenhagenized at once by the invincible British Navy"[5] at the outbreak of hostilities. In the 1881 Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States, John J. Lalor, editor, wrote: But, even when the [embargo] was repealed in 1809, the belief that Great Britain would "Copenhagenize" any American navy which might be formed was sufficient to deter the democratic leaders from anything bolder than non-intercourse laws, until the idea of invading Canada took root and blossomed into a declaration of war. [6] In 1993 Azar Gat, in War In Human Civilization, used the term twice, referring to "Britain's reluctance to copenhagenize the German Navy" prior to the First World War, and again that "the fall of France led the British to copenhagenize the French Navy" with their attack on Mers-el-Kébir. [7]
Explanation
The term "Copenhagenization" is best seen as a type of shorthand used by historians, by making comparison to a distinct and well-known incident. For example, a writer could describe an army as seeking to "do a Cannae", [8] or say that a navy was "Trafalgared", [9] in order to avoid a lengthy description. However, the term is of less value in this regard, as Copenhagen was the scene of another battle six years earlier, when under similar circumstances the Royal Navy attacked a Danish fleet lying at anchor, sinking three Danish ships and capturing twelve. In the bombardment of 1807, the city itself was bombarded by the British Army to force the capitulation. Although the writer in the Aurora in 1808,[2] and Emmons in 1830,[4] were clear enough in referring to the 1807 incident, it is less clear which was meant by Lalor and Winsor, while the modern uses by Azar Gat are better understood as references to the events of 1801.[7]
References
1. A. N. Ryan, "The Causes of the British Attack upon Copenhagen in 1807." English Historical Review (1953): 37–55. in JSTOR (https://www.jstor.org/stable/555118)
2. Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, 9 April 1808 p.4
3. Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, 9 April 1808 p.6
4. Emmons, Richard (1830). The fredoniad, or Independence preserved (https://archive.org/det ails/fredoniadorindep02emmo). Philadelphia. p. 35 (https://archive.org/details/fredoniadorind ep02emmo/page/35).
5. Winsor, Justin (1884). Narrative and critical history ofAmerica (https://archive.org/details/narr ativecritica07wins). Vol. 7. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. pp. 273 (https://archive.o rg/details/narrativecritica07wins/page/273)–274.
6. Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States by the BestAmerican and European Writers: Maynard, Merrill, and Co. (1899) II.18.13 and II.18.26.
7. Gat,Azar (2006). War In Human Civilization (https://books.google.com/books?id=sRnxxGxfM LYC&q=azar+gat). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 610. ISBN 978-0-1992-3663-3. Explanation
8. H Borowski, Military Planning in the Twentieth Century ( 1986 ) ISBN 9781428993433 p98 (https://books.google.com/books?id=x9cmuEoLYIQC&dq=%22do+a+Cannae%22&pg=PA9 8) 9. John Keegan, The Price ofAdmiralty (2011) ISBN 9781446494509 p (https://books.google.c om/books?id=15ml_9mI6AEC&dq=%22Trafalgared%22&pg=PP163)
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